Why is a woman’s testimony considered equal to half that of a man’s in Islam?

One issue frequently raised by critics of Islam concerns gender equality. They often point to the issue of testimony as evidence to support the claim that Islam discriminates between men and women. Specifically, they argue that because the testimony of two women is considered equivalent to that of a single man, Islam supposedly views women as lacking the wisdom or intelligence necessary to provide reliable testimony. To support this claim, they commonly cite the following verse: {O believers! When you contract a loan for a fixed period of time, commit it to writing. …Call upon two of your men to witness. If two men cannot be found, then one man and two women of your choice will witness—so if one of the women forgets the other may remind her...} (Qurʾān 2:282). This verse is often misunderstood by critics of Islam. It does not refer to shahādah (judicial testimony) before a judge, but rather to ishhād (affidavit) in the context of financial transactions. Specifically, it addresses situations where a person borrows money: the debtor—the person who owes the money—formally acknowledges the debt in writing. Witnesses are then called to attest to the existence and terms of the debt, such as the amount borrowed and the repayment conditions. Their role is to confirm that the debtor has honestly acknowledged what he owes, creating a clear record that can be referred to if disputes arise later. The verse provides guidance on who can serve as witnesses in this process, but it is not about the weight of women’s testimony in court or about the competence of women to testify in general. Critics often confuse this scenario of ishhād (affidavit) with shahādah (judicial testimony), wrongly claiming that Islam views women as less capable of giving testimony before a judge. In reality, the verse deals with the debtor’s acknowledgment of a loan, not with legal proceedings in which a judge determines the outcome between parties. In the case of shahādah, a judge requires confirmation from a witness, and this does not depend on the witness’s sex but solely on the judge’s confidence in the truthfulness of the testimony, regardless of the number or gender of the witnesses. Thus, once the judge is assured of the evidence’s validity, he may accept the testimony of two men, two women, a man and a woman, a man and two women, a woman and two men, or even a single man or a single woman. In other words, the sex of the witnesses has no bearing on the judge’s ruling. The verse in question, however, concerns ishhād (affidavit), meaning that the debtor uses witnesses to confirm his debt—that is, the person who borrowed the money formally acknowledges, in front of witnesses, that he owes this debt to the lender. It does not pertain to judicial testimony in which a judge decides between litigants. Consequently, critics overlook that the verse addresses debtors rather than judges, and that it does not apply to all debts or all debtors. Instead, it offers guidance for specific types of debt under particular circumstances—namely, larger or more complex loans—where witnesses and documentation are particularly important. The distinction between ishhād (affidavit) and shahādah (judicial testimony) has long been recognized and carefully explained by many jurists, including Ibn Taymiyyah, his student Ibn al-Qayyim, and more recent scholars such as Muḥammad ʿAbduh and Maḥmūd Shaltūt.¹

Ibn Taymiyyah and Ibn al-Qayyim explained that the bayyinah (evidence) on which a judge bases his ruling serves to prevent injustice, and its juristic and legal basis is derived from the ḥadīth (tradition) of the Prophet (PBUH): “If people were given whatever they claim, men would [unjustly] claim the wealth and lives of others, but the bayyinah (evidence) is upon the claimant, and the oath is upon the one who denies [it].”² Evidence in jurisprudence refers to everything that serves to reveal the truth. It may be established through four witnesses, or in certain cases through three witnesses—as in the case of proving insolvency³—or through two witnesses, or even a single witness, including a single woman. Accordingly, the Prophet (PBUH)’s statement, “the bayyinah (evidence) is upon the claimant,” means that the claimant must present whatever proves their claim, and once the truthfulness of the claim is established by any valid means, the judge rules in their favour. Thus, the criteria for evidence may be fulfilled by the testimony of one or more men, and it may likewise be fulfilled by the testimony of one or more women, depending on the specific type of testimony required by the judge in order to issue a decision.⁴ The key point is that Islamic law does not restrict valid evidence to a fixed gender–number formula. Rather, the gender and number of witnesses vary according to the nature of the claim, the circumstances involved, and what is sufficient to establish the truth in the judge’s view. In other words, the gender and number of witnesses are case-specific, not a universal standard. Ibn al-Qayyim stated on this point:⁵

With regard to the wisdom behind equating the testimony of two women to that of one man in financial matters, Ibn Taymiyyah argued that, in their social context (seventh-century Arabia), women did not typically engage in such transactions. However, if a woman acquired experience and fully understood these matters, her testimony would be regarded as equivalent to that of a man. Ibn Taymiyyah stated:⁶

The same view was expressed by Muḥammad ʿAbduh, who explained the reason for the distinction between the number of men and women in the verse. He clarified that, within the social context of the time (seventh-century Arabia), women typically did not attend meetings related to financial transactions or business, and therefore did not acquire significant experience in that field. Muḥammad ʿAbduh emphasized that this social context is subject to development and change and does not reflect the inherent nature of women across the ages. He stated:⁷

Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt agreed with the independent reasoning of Ibn Taymiyyah, Ibn al-Qayyim, and Muḥammad ʿAbduh. He stated that the fact that a woman’s testimony in the matter of liʿān (an Islamic legal procedure in which a husband and wife invoke mutual curses to resolve an accusation of adultery) is considered equal to that of a man affirms her capabilities and contradicts the claims made by critics.⁸ Allāh says: {And those who accuse their wives ˹of adultery˺ but have no witness except themselves, the accuser must testify, swearing four times by Allāh that he is telling the truth, and a fifth oath that Allāh may condemn him if he is lying. For her to be spared the punishment, she must swear four times by Allāh that he is telling a lie, and a fifth oath that Allāh may be displeased with her if he is telling the truth} (Qurʾān 24:6–9). These verses provide guidance for situations in which a husband accuses his wife of adultery but lacks the evidence recognized and required by Islamic law, namely, the testimony of four witnesses. In such a scenario, the Qurʾān instructs that the husband should swear an oath four times asserting his wife’s guilt, and on the fifth oath, invoke Allāh’s curse upon himself if he is lying. If the woman takes no action in response, her silence is presumed as an admission of guilt, and the ḥadd (prescribed punishment) for adultery would be inflicted on her. However, to prevent the infliction of the ḥadd, the Qurʾān instructs that the woman should respond by swearing an oath that he is lying four times, and on the fifth oath, invoke the punishment of Allāh upon herself if she is lying. This is a case in which the testimony of a woman effectively overrides that of a man. The verses thus establish conclusively that a man’s testimony and a woman’s are regarded as fully equal in Islam. If a woman’s testimony were valued as only half that of a man, she would need to swear ten times in response to her husband’s five oaths, since ten is double five—but this is not required. To counteract the force of the law against her, she need only match her husband’s number of oaths. Therefore, these verses provide clear and mathematically certain evidence regarding the equal value of a woman’s testimony compared with that of a man in Islam. Shaykh Maḥmūd Shaltūt stated that the verse, {O believers! When you contract a loan for a fixed period of time, commit it to writing... Call upon two of your men to witness. If two men cannot be found, then one man and two women of your choice will witness—so if one of the women forgets, the other may remind her...} (Qurʾān 2:282), does not concern the testimony upon which a judge issues a ruling. Rather, it provides guidance on how parties in a transaction can secure their rights at the time the contract is made. This does not imply that the truth cannot be established by the testimony of a single woman, or by the testimony of women without men, or that a judge cannot issue a ruling accordingly, for what the judge requires is al-bayyinah (evidence).⁹ Again, stating that the testimony of two women is equal to that of one man does not imply that women have weak minds or are inferior to men, for, as Shaykh Muḥammad ʿAbduh explained:¹⁰

In fact, the verse reflects what was typical of most women at that time (seventh-century Arabia) and remains largely true for many women today, who still do not participate in financial transactions as frequently as men. In this context, the involvement of some women in such transactions is considered an exception rather than the norm.

Hence, the verse that critics of Islam often cite to claim that Islam degrades women by making their testimony equal to half that of a man actually addresses the witnessing of a debt contract, not testimony before a judge. Moreover, the verse does not require both women to testify. In fact, the Qurʾān clearly specifies and limits the role of the second woman to that of an assistant—nothing more: {If two men cannot be found, then one man and two women of your choice will witness—so if one of the women forgets the other may remind her} (Qurʾān 2:282). That is, if the second woman—who is not giving testimony—finds any part of the statement of the first woman—who is testifying—indicative of a misunderstanding of the contract or forgetfulness, she may intervene and assist in clarifying her understanding or refreshing her memory. In other words, the testimony of the primary woman remains a single, independent testimony. It is entirely up to her whether to accept the assistance, and if she does not, she has the final say. One might ask: why is an assistant needed in the first place? The Qurʾān prescribes the presence of two female witnesses—one primary and one assistant—in financial matters not because women’s memory is inherently weak or because they are deficient in business matters, but because there are natural differences between the genders in how they retain information. Men may excel at remembering certain types of information, while women may excel at remembering others. Research indicates that overall, neither gender is superior in memory, though subtle differences appear in the ways men and women recall information. Elizabeth Loftus, a distinguished professor at the University of California, Irvine, and a leading researcher on human memory, states:¹¹

Hence, by providing an assistant to the female witness, the Qurʾān points to subtle differences between the genders in how information is retained—differences that contemporary research has only recently begun to explore and substantiate. Although these differences are slight, their existence is well established. As earlier stated, it is also essential to understand the historical and social context of verse (2:282). Over fourteen centuries ago, women in seventh-century Arabia generally did not participate in commercial transactions or accompany trading caravans, and consequently many lacked the practical experience required to witness debt contracts. Even when two women were present at the time of contracting, the primary witness might later be unable to recall specific details or appear before a judge due to compelling circumstances such as pregnancy or childbirth, in which case the second woman serves as a safeguard and support. Essentially, the verse was revealed in a society in which women were excluded from financial and commercial spheres, leaving them with minimal exposure to business dealings. Nevertheless, the Qurʾān integrated women into these spheres which were overwhelmingly dominated by men at the time. The verse thus appears to seek to redress an existing imbalance between men, who were generally well-versed in financial and commercial matters, and women, who often lacked such experience, by providing women with additional support where needed to compensate for this inequity. Finally, it must be recognized that in Islam, testimony is an obligation and a responsibility, and when Allāh facilitates the fulfilment of this responsibility for women, He neither diminishes nor dishonors their status but instead alleviates a potential hardship placed upon them.

It is worth noting that if a single female witness were not considered sufficient, or were regarded as deficient in any way, this would have applied universally across all scenarios and circumstances. However, the Qurʾān contains other verses that make no distinction or special provision for female witnesses. As noted earlier, a woman’s testimony is considered equal to that of a man in matters such as liʿān (an Islamic legal procedure in which a husband and wife invoke mutual curses to settle an accusation of adultery). Similarly, a woman’s testimony is accepted on par with that of a man regarding the sighting of the crescent of Ramaḍān (the Islamic month of fasting). In addition, a woman’s testimony is accepted in issues specifically pertaining to women. Ibn Qudāmah stated in al-Muġnī:¹²

He clarified this ruling elsewhere, stating:¹³

In fact, in matters pertaining to women that men are less familiar with, only women’s testimony is accepted, while men’s testimony is not considered, because women generally have stronger memory and greater expertise in these domestic (family or household) matters. In many cases, the testimony of a single woman is deemed sufficient. Ibn Qudāmah stated:¹⁴

ʿUqbah ibn al-Ḥārith narrated that he had married Umm Yaḥyá bint abī Ihāb. He said: “A black slave woman came and said, ‘I suckled both of you.’ I mentioned this to the Prophet (PBUH), and he turned away from me. I then moved to the other side and mentioned it to him again. He said, “How can you [keep her as your wife] when she [the black slave woman] claimed that she suckled both of you?” Thereupon, he (PBUH) forbade him from her (i.e., instructed him to separate from her).¹⁵ In this case, the Prophet (PBUH) acted solely on the claim of one woman—a slave woman—who said that she had suckled both spouses. There were no male witnesses, no corroborating testimony, and no further investigation mentioned. Based on her statement alone, the Prophet (PBUH) forbade ʿUqbah from remaining with his wife, effectively dissolving the marriage. This shows that a single woman’s testimony can be legally decisive, especially when the matter falls squarely within women’s domestic expertise. Breastfeeding is a private, domestic matter that typically occurs within the household and is something women are far more likely to know and remember accurately than men. Classical jurists explicitly categorized such issues as matters in which women’s testimony is authoritative. Men’s testimony is irrelevant in such cases because men would normally have no direct knowledge of who breastfed whom in infancy. This is why, in issues of breastfeeding, men’s testimony is often not considered, while women’s testimony is accepted—even when it is singular. This undermines the claim that women’s testimony is deemed inherently deficient. If women’s testimony were considered inherently weak or half that of men, it would not be accepted independently in a case that results in the dissolution of a marriage. ʿUqbah’s report demonstrates that Islamic law evaluates testimony based on relevance and expertise, not gender. In short, this report is a textual proof that women’s testimony can be independent, decisive, and superior to men’s testimony in matters within their sphere of knowledge. Ibn al-Qayyim commented on ʿUqbah’s report, stating:¹⁶

Maʿrūf ad-Dawālībī offered an eloquent comment on this report, stating:¹⁷

Most importantly, if the testimony of a single woman were truly considered half that of a man, none of the ḥadīths (Prophetic traditions) transmitted by a single female narrator would ever have been accepted. Yet not only are they accepted, they are also revered. The ḥadīth of a single reliable woman concerning what the Prophet (PBUH) said or did is accepted without reservation in every case. This is highly significant, for testimony in religious matters is far more consequential than testimony in worldly affairs. Indeed, the highest form of testimony in Islam is to bear witness that one heard a ḥadīth from the Prophet (PBUH). An authentic ḥadīth is accepted by all Muslims regardless of the gender of its narrator, since ḥadīths transmitted by women possess the same level of authenticity as those transmitted by men. No ḥadīth has ever been rejected solely on the basis that its narrator was a woman. Ash-Shawkānī stated:¹⁸

Ibn al-Qayyim said:¹⁹

To reiterate, narrations concerning religious matters carry greater significance than testimony given in a legal trial. In Islamic law, the conditions required of a witness are not determined by sex, but by two other criteria. First, the witness must be just and truthful, regardless of gender. Second, the witness must possess sufficient knowledge of the matter to be aware of it and able to testify accurately concerning it. Consequently, a witness’s testimony will not be accepted if the judge determines that the individual is overly sympathetic or tender-hearted, as this would indicate that their response to criminal matters and their capacity to testify about them is weak or compromised.²⁰ In fact, there is a Prophetic tradition demonstrating that the difference in the weight assigned to male and female witnesses in certain circumstances is not due to any inherent inequality of the sexes in Islam. Abū Hurayrah reported that he heard the Messenger of Allāh (PBUH) say: “The testimony of a Bedouin (a nomadic Arab of the desert) against a city dweller is not permissible.”²¹ This tradition illustrates one of the factors that can invalidate testimony. It states that a desert dweller may not testify concerning a city or town resident. Such testimony would be considered unreliable, for how could a person who lives far away in the desert and is generally unfamiliar with urban circumstances accurately testify about events that take place in a city or town? Note that the testimony of a desert dweller is not treated as equivalent to that of two women, nor to that of a single woman—it is simply not accepted. The reality is that Islam’s provision regarding the testimony of a woman being considered half that of a man in financial transactions is not rooted in discrimination. It does not reflect any inherent inferiority of female witnesses compared to male witnesses. Rather, it is based on the distinct roles and social experiences of men and women as recognized in Islamic law. In this way, the common misconception regarding the value of women’s testimony has been effectively refuted.

In a nutshell, justice and equality are intrinsic values and cardinal principles in Islamic law. Nevertheless, while the Divine Law is not an adversary of women, it does not cater to the whims or preferences of Western feminists at the expense of human nature and the varying circumstances of human life. In contrast, many Western modern societies endorse practices that contradict the innate dispositions of men and women in order to demonstrate purported equality. Consequently, women pursuing absolute power are losing connection with their real nature, while men are being emasculated, marginalized, and weakened. In fact, feminism in the West did not result in the liberation of women, but rather has contributed to the decline of Western societies, which have become decadent and have lost their traditional values. Islam, however, does not aim to satisfy whims at the cost of the truth. As Muslims, we are to adhere to what Allāh has revealed to the Prophet (PBUH), for the ultimate truth lies solely therein: {And follow what is revealed to you, and be patient until Allāh passes His judgment} (Qurʾān 10:109). And we should not allow those who lack certainty in faith to cause us to waver: {And do not be disturbed by those who have no sure faith} (Qurʾān 30:60).